We introduce a new operator for general rationing problems in which, besides conflicting claims, individual baselines play an important role in the rationing process. The operator builds onto ideas of composition, which are not only frequent in rationing, but also in related problems such as bargaining, choice, and queuing. We characterize the operator and show how it preserves some standard axioms in the literature on rationing. We also relate it to recent contributions in such literature.
Introduction
In a seminal contribution, O'Neill (1982) introduced a simple model to analyze the problem in which a group of individuals have conflicting claims over an insufficient amount of a (perfectly divisible) good. Ever since, a sizable literature has emerged dealing with standard rationing problems fitting such model. 1 Recently, there has been a growing interest in analyzing more complex rationing situations in which not only claims, but also rights, references, or other objective entitlements, play an important role in the rationing process (e. The aim of this note is to explore an operator that allows us to move from the domain of standard rationing rules to the domain of rules in which a baselines profile complements the claims profile of a standard rationing problem. 2 Our operator is inspired by the properties of composition, which pertain to the way rules react to tentative allocations of the available amount to allocate (e.g., Moulin, 2000) . More precisely, think of the following situation: after having divided the allocation of the available amount among its creditors, it turns out that the actual value of the amount is larger than was initially assumed. Then, two options are open: either the tentative division is canceled altogether and the actual problem is solved, or we add to the initial distribution the result of applying the rule to the remaining amount.
The requirement of composition up is that both ways of proceeding should result in the same awards vectors. Think now of the dual case. Namely, after having divided the available amount among its creditors one finds that the actual value of the amount to divide falls short of what was assumed. Here again we can ignore the initial division and apply the rule to the revised problem, or we can apply the rule to the problem in which the initial claims are substituted by the (unfeasible) allocation initially proposed. The requirement of composition down is that both ways of proceeding should result in the same awards vectors.
3
The operator we present here behaves in a similar way. More precisely, it associates with each rule defined for the standard rationing model a rule for the general model with baselines, 1 The reader is referred to Thomson (2003) for a survey. 2 The notion of operators for the domain of rationing rules was first introduced by Thomson and Yeh (2008) . 3 These properties are reminiscent of the so-called "path independence" axiom for choice functions (e.g., Plott, 1973) . They also have a relative in the theory of axiomatic bargaining: the so-called "step-by-step negotiations" axiom introduced by Kalai (1977) , which is the basis for the characterization of the egalitarian solution in such context. The same principle has also been frequently used in other related contexts like taxation, queuing, or resource allocation (e.g., Young, 1988; Moulin and Stong, 2002; Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, 2012) .
which solves problems following a two-stage process. In the first stage, baselines (truncated by claims) either replace claims (if they are not collectively feasible) or are awarded to agents (if they are collectively feasible). In the second stage, the primitive rule is used to solve the standard problem that results after adjusting claims and endowment according to the process of the first stage. We characterize such a composition extension operator and show how it preserves some standard axioms in the literature on rationing.
A main focus of this note is to compare the composition operator directly to similar types of operators that have appeared in the literature. In particular, the so-called baselines first 
Preliminaries

The benchmark model
We study rationing problems in a variable-population model. The set of potential claimants, or agents, is identified with the set of natural numbers N. Let N be the class of finite subsets of N, with generic element N . Let n denote the cardinality of N . For each i ∈ N , let c i ∈ R + be i's claim and c ≡ (c i ) i∈N the claims profile.
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A (standard rationing) problem is a triple consisting of a population N ∈ N , a claims profile c ∈ R n + , and an endowment E ∈ R + such that i∈N c i ≥ E. Let C ≡ i∈N c i . To avoid unnecessary complication, we assume C > 0. Let D N be the set of rationing problems with
Given a problem (N, c, E) ∈ D N , an allocation is a vector x ∈ R n satisfying the following two conditions: (i) for each i ∈ N , 0 ≤ x i ≤ c i and (ii) i∈N x i = E. We refer to (i) as boundedness and (ii) Each rule R has a dual rule R * defined as
The general framework
As in Hougaard et al., (2013) we consider the extended framework of a general (rationing)
problem (or problem with baselines) consisting of a population N ∈ N , a baselines profile
+ , a claims profile c ∈ R n + , and an endowment E ∈ R + such that i∈N c i ≥ E. We denote by E N the class of general problems with population N and
Given a general problem (N, b, c, E) ∈ E, an allocation is a vector x ∈ R n satisfying the following two conditions:
An (extension) operator associates with each rule defined for the standard model a rule for the general model. We consider an operator that solves problems following a two-stage process. In the first stage, baselines (truncated by claims) either replace claims (if they are not collectively feasible) or are awarded to agents (if they are collectively feasible). In the second stage, the primitive rule is used to solve the standard problem that results after adjusting claims and endowment according to the process of the first stage. In the spirit of the properties of composition up and composition down, described in the introduction, we refer to it as the composition extension operator.
Formally,
The composition extension operator can be directly compared to the baselines-first operator defined in Hougaard et al., (2013) . The difference lies where E ≤ T (b, c), in which case the baselines-first extension operator uses the dual rule of R.
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To use the dual rule, as in the baselines-first extension operator, is in many ways as natural as using the principle of composition down:
. Thus, the baselines-first extension operator also implements a natural principle for the case in which truncated baselines are not collectively feasible; namely, subtracting the part of the loss found by rationing with claims as truncated baselines.
In what follows, we dwell on the similarities and differences between the two operators. We start out with a comparison based on axiomatic characterizations.
An axiomatic characterization
We provide in this section a set of axioms characterizing the composition extension operator.
These axioms are closely related to the characterization of the baselines-first extension operator and hence the reader is referred to Hougaard et al., (2013) for further details about most of them.
Truncation of excessive claims:
The fourth axiom is new and thus deserves further explanation. It deals with the two polar cases of non-informative baselines and argues that both of them should be treated equally.
More precisely, it states that a problem with null baselines and the corresponding problem in which baselines are equal to claims should be allocated identically.
These four axioms together characterize the range of the composition extension operator, introduced above. 
Preservation of axioms
The composition extension operator associates with each standard rule a new rule to solve (rationing) problems with baselines. A natural question is whether the rule so constructed inherits the properties of the original rule. To explore this question, we consider several standard axioms in the literature on rationing problems, formulating in different ways the principle of solidarity, which has a long tradition in the theory of justice (e.g., Thomson, 1983; Roemer, 1986 ; Moreno-Ternero and Roemer, 2006).
The first group comprises fixed-population axioms.
Resource monotonicity: for each (N, c, E) ∈ D and each E > E, with E ≤ c i , we have
Claims monotonicity: for each (N, c, E) ∈ D, each i ∈ N , and each c i > c i , we have
Linked claims-resource monotonicity: for each (N, c, E) ∈ D and i ∈ N ,
The second group comprises variable-population axioms.
Population monotonicity: for each (N, c, E) ∈ D and (N , c , E) ∈ D such that N ⊆ N and
Linked resource-population monotonicity: for each (N, c, E) ∈ D and each (N , c , E ) ∈ D such that N ⊆ N , c N = c, and
Resource-population uniformity: for each (N, c, E) ∈ D and (N , c , E ) ∈ D such that N ⊆ N and c N = c, then, either
Consistency: for each (N, c, E) ∈ D, each M ⊂ N, and each i ∈ M, we have R i (N, c, E) =
We say that an axiom is preserved by our composition operator if whenever a rule R satisfies it, then the induced rule R c satisfies the corresponding general version of the axiom.
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Our first preservation result refers to the properties that are individually preserved.
Theorem 2 The properties of resource monotonicity, consistency, and resource-population uniformity are preserved by the composition extension operator.
The second preservation result refers to the properties that are preserved in pairs, either by themselves or "with the assistance" of an additional property.
Theorem 3
The following pairs are preserved by the composition extension operator: claims monotonicity and linked claims-resource monotonicity; population monotonicity and linked resource-population monotonicity, if assisted by resource monotonicity.
In other words, if a rule R satisfies claims monotonicity and linked claims-resource monotonicity, then the induced rule R c satisfies the corresponding two general properties. Also, if a rule R satisfies population monotonicity and linked resource-population monotonicity, and in addition is resource monotonic, then the induced rule R c satisfies the corresponding three general properties.
Concluding remarks
We have introduced the composition extension operator within the framework of extended rationing problems with exogeneous baselines. The composition extension operator was compared to a natural counterpart -the baselines-first extension operator defined and analyzed in Hougaard et al., (2013) . Both operators are in many ways equally natural. For example, concerning preservation of properties of the associated standard rationing rules the results are highly compatible. Yet, comparing the axiomatic foundation it appears that the way in which the composition extension operator treats the case of uninformative baselines is somewhat more desirable than that of the baselines-first operator.
Finally, we note that the composition extension operator we introduce here is reminiscent of the approach we take in Hougaard et al., (2012) to analyze rationing problems. Therein, we assume that, rather than being exogenously given, baselines associate with each rationing problem some (not necessarily feasible) allocation. For each baseline, we impose the two-stage 6 Appendix: Proof of the results
Proof of Theorem 1
It is straightforward to see that, for any (standard) rule R, R c satisfies the four axioms.
Thus, we focus on the converse implication. Let S be a rule satisfying the four axioms and In other words, R assigns to each problem the allocation that S yields for the corresponding problem with baselines in which baselines are null. Then,
, which implies that S ≡ R c .
Proof of Theorem 2
Note first that, by Theorem 1 in Hougaard et al., (2013), the three properties are preserved by the baselines-first extension operator. As this operator coincides with the composition extension operator for the case in which truncated baselines are collectively feasible, we only need to focus on the opposite case to prove the statements of the theorem.
Let R be a rule satisfying resource monotonicity. Let (N, c, E) ∈ D and each E > E, with E ≤ c i . Let b ∈ R n be a baseline profile and let i ∈ N be a given agent. If E < E ≤ T (b, c),
. Now, as R satisfies resource monotonicity the desired inequality follows.
Let R be a rule satisfying consistency. Let (N, c, E) ∈ D and
The aim is to show that, for any M ⊂ N ,
Fix M ⊂ N and let E = j∈M x j and T (b, c) = j∈M t j (b, c). Then, it is straightforward to
for each i ∈ N , and thus
To conclude, the statement on resource-population uniformity follows from the fact that such axiom is equivalent to the combination of resource monotonicity and consistency (e.g., Hougaard et al., 2013) .
Proof of Theorem 3
Again, by Theorem 3 in Hougaard et al., (2013), we only need to focus on the case in which truncated baselines are collectively infeasible to prove the statements of the theorem.
Let R be a rule satisfying claims monotonicity and linked claims-resource monotonicity.
Our aim is to show that R c satisfies the general versions of the two properties.
Claims monotonicity. Let (N, c, E) ∈ D and i ∈ N , such that c i ≤ c i . Let b ∈ R n + be a baseline profile, T (b, c) = j∈N t j (b, c), and T (b, c) = j∈N t j (b, c ). (N, (t N \{i} (b, c), t i (b, c ) ), E).
As R satisfies claims monotonicity, the desired inequality follows.
and R (N, t(b, c) , E) + ε, from where the desired inequality follows.
Thus, the desired inequality becomes
Now, by balance and boundedness, the right hand side of (3) is bounded above by T − E + E + ε − T (b, c), which is precisely the left hand side of (3).
As for the second statement of the theorem, let R be a rule satisfying resource monotonicity, population monotonicity and linked resource-population monotonicity. By Theorem 2, R c satisfies the general property of resource monotonicity. Our aim is to show that R c also satisfies the general properties of population monotonicity and linked resource-population monotonicity. (N, t(b, c) , E). As R satisfies population monotonicity, the desired inequality follows. (N, t(b, c) , E). By resource monotonicity and population monotonicity of R, the desired inequality follows.
Appendix that is not part of the submission for publication
We here show that Theorem 1 is tight. In what follows, let A denote the (standard) constrained equal awards rule and P denote the (standard) proportional rule.
• Let S be defined by S (N, c, It is straightforward to show that S is a well-defined rule that satisfies truncation of excessive claims, baseline invariance, and polar baseline equivalence, but not baseline truncation.
• Let S be defined by It is straightforward to show that S is a well-defined rule that satisfies baseline truncation, baseline invariance, and polar baseline equivalence, but not truncation of excessive claims.
• Let S be defined by It is straightforward to show that S is a well-defined rule that satisfies baseline truncation, truncation of excessive claims, and polar baseline equivalence, but not baseline invariance.
• Let S be defined by It is straightforward to show that S is a well-defined rule that satisfies baseline truncation, truncation of excessive claims and baseline invariance, but not polar baseline equivalence.
